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THE HIGH COST OF LOW SUPERVISION:  HOW 
SERVICEMEMBERS WILL INEVITABLY PAY FOR THE 
CFPB’S REACTIVE APPROACH TO THE MILITARY 
LENDING ACT 
“The last thing you want is a young sailor programming 
a Tomahawk missile in the Persian Gulf who is worrying 
about whether his car is being repossessed back home.” 
Chalker W. Brown, Retired Navy Captain 1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When one considers the stressors military members endure, 
thoughts often turn to the prospect of being deployed and the constant 
background threat of combat.2  However, it is not uncommon to encoun-
ter a servicemember who is also shouldering the growing weight of pay-
day loan debt.3  Following up on military complaints of abusive lending 
practices, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) released a landmark re-
port that brought to light the severity of the payday lending market.4  Not 
only were lenders found to be knowingly exploiting military members 
because of their unique characteristics, but the DOD also discovered that 
lenders were threatening servicemembers’ livelihoods by stating they 
would report their debts to commanding officers.5  This kind of threat 
carried the potential consequence of losing a security clearance and pos-
sibly being discharged from the military.6 
 
 1. See Diana B. Henriques, Seeking Quick Loans, Soldiers Race into High-Interest 
Traps, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/07/business/seeking-
quick-loans-soldiers-race-into-highinterest-traps.html (providing this quote from Captain 
Brown). 
 2. See generally Maj Pflanz & Scott Sonnek, Work Stress in the Military: Prevalence, 
Causes, and Relationship to Emotional Health, 167 MIL. MED. 877, 878 (2002) (presenting 
information about occupational stressors impacting servicemembers). 
 3. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT 
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 10–15 (2006), http://archive.de-
fense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_to_congress_final.pdf (reporting on the widespread use of payday 
loans by military members). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 42. 
 6. See id. at 42–43 (“Some had experienced disciplinary action as a result of their at-
tempt to solve financial difficulties through predatory loans.  The extent of the disciplinary 
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Servicemembers should not have to navigate the lending industry 
on top of the sacrifices they have already made to serve our country.  To 
explore the variables creating this problem and then analyze reactive fed-
eral actions, this Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II provides background 
information about payday loans and their relationship with the military.7  
Within this background, there is also a review of the Military Lending 
Act (“MLA”) and a discussion about whether authority to regulate MLA 
compliance was granted to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”).  Part III illustrates the CFPB’s move under the Trump Admin-
istration from a proactive approach, where monitoring and supervising 
MLA compliance was considered part of the Bureau’s powers, to a reac-
tive approach, where there is no longer an agreement about this previous 
authority.8  Part IV argues that the CFPB’s reactive approach will dimin-
ish the effectiveness of the MLA, increase abusive and deceptive prac-
tices, and subsequently harm servicemembers.9  Part V concludes by de-
termining that the CFPB should continue authority over the MLA 
compliance as a practical matter to safeguard the military from predatory 
lending.10  In light of the CFPB currently maintaining a reactive approach, 
this section also recommends that the states pick up where the Bureau 
leaves off to mitigate the targeting of military members.  
II.  PREDATORY LENDING AND THE MILITARY 
A.         The Burden of Payday Loans 
Payday lenders regularly promote their short-term loans as a con-
venient and quick way for consumers to bridge the gap between an unex-
pected expense and their next paycheck.11  Consider an individual who 
needs to borrow a small sum of $200.  The borrower can walk into any 
payday lender storefront, like Veterans First Financial Services,12 and 
 
action went from letters of reprimand and non-judicial punishment, to loss of promotions and 
separation from the military.”). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. See Bart J. Wilson et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Demand for Payday Loans, 
10 BE J. OF ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2010) (providing an in-depth empirical overview of 
the positive and negative consequences that flow from payday loans). 
 12. See STEVE TRIPOLI & AMY MIX, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., IN HARM’S WAY—AT 
HOME:  CONSUMER SCAMS AND THE DIRECT TARGETING OF AMERICA’S MILITARY AND 
VETERANS 25 (2003) (“The Internet home page of Veterans First Financial Services features 
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receive the loan on the spot.13  This transaction routinely involves the 
individual post-dating a check two weeks out for the full amount of the 
credit, plus any fees and interest.14  Easy enough. However, the conven-
ience of this fast cash is often outweighed by a significant cost to the 
consumer.15 
The servicemember who merely wanted to borrow $200, and per-
haps pay some low fees and interest, will often end up in a debt trap be-
cause of the payday loan advancement.16  These short-term lenders have 
been documented to impose annual rates as high as 780%.17  When the 
borrower’s next check is unable to cover the growing cost of the first debt, 
oftentimes the borrower will be trapped into rolling over another loan.18  
Not surprisingly, payday loan borrowers typically take on five or more 
loans per year once they are caught in this trap.19  This predatory and 
cyclic relationship between lender and borrower places the consumers in 
a financial situation where they cannot stay afloat.20   
In 2006, the DOD released a report highlighting the vulnerability 
of the military population to payday lending.21  This study revealed many 
variables that make servicemembers especially attractive to predatory 
lenders.22  For example, individuals frequently enlist at a young age, 
 
an undulating American flag, and at the top an eye-grabbing, full-color display of military 
insignias in motion across the screen.  A three-part message flashes over those insignias:  
‘You’ve worked hard—invest your money the way YOU want—If you’re a retired veteran, 
VFFS, Inc., can help!’”). 
 13. See id. at 12 (describing how a servicemember can obtain a payday loan with relative 
ease). 
 14. Id. at 40. 
 15. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing an example where an Air Force 
member borrowed $500 and fell into a debt trap where she ended up owing $12,750 after 
multiple debt rollovers). 
 16. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 14 (“Borrowers become trapped in repeat 
borrowing or renewals of loans in order to keep the check used to obtain the loan from bounc-
ing, a key reason that payday loans are debt traps.”). 
 17. Henriques, supra note 1 (stating that some lenders around military bases have been 
shown to charge rates as high as 780%). 
 18. See OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LENDERS TARGET THE 
MILITARY: EVIDENCE LIES IN INDUSTRY’S OWN DATA 2 (2005) (providing an example of how 
a borrower often needs to roll over an old loan into a new loan in order to pay mounting fees 
and interest). 
 19. See KEITH ERNEST, JOHN FARRIS & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2004) (“Ninety-one 
percent of all payday loans are made to borrowers with five or more payday loans per year.”). 
 20. See Henriques, supra note 1 (explaining how the short-term loan fees kept taking 
large chunk of the military couple’s paycheck, requiring them to borrow more debt). 
 21. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3. 
 22. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 4 (listing characteristics that lenders have in 
common for preying on the military). 
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before they have had much financial responsibility.23  Upon enlistment, 
they receive a steady paycheck from the government.24  Even when the 
economy ebbs, lenders can rely on these consistent checks that rarely wa-
ver.25  Additionally, servicemembers are subject to regular location 
changes which can put a strain on finances when spouses have to seek 
new employment.26  Factors like these, coupled with a strict military cul-
ture of financial responsibility, can place a burden on servicemembers 
that encourages them to take out quick loans in times of financial strug-
gle.27 
B.         The Military Lending Act and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau 
In 2006, Congress passed the MLA to combat the issues pre-
sented by the DOD’s 2006 study.28  A vital provision of the MLA is that 
servicemembers and their immediate family members cannot be charged 
annualized interest rates that exceed 36%.29  This requirement is espe-
cially notable for short-term payday loans because this special military 
annualized rate includes all additional fees.30  Since most payday loans 
earn a considerably higher interest rate, servicemembers are no longer 
 
 23. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 4 (“Predatory lenders seek out young and 
financially inexperienced borrowers . . . .”). 
 24. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 10 (suggesting that lenders often target ser-
vicemembers because of their financial inexperience combined with their steady jobs). 
 25. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 4 (“They are paid regularly and are not likely 
to be downsized, outsource, or quit their employment.”). 
 26. See James Hosek & Shelley MacDermid Wadsworth, Economic Conditions of Mili-
tary Families, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 41, 41 (2013) (“[T]he military requires service mem-
bers to move frequently, spouses’ careers are regularly interrupted, and employers are hesitant 
to offer them jobs that require a large investment in training or a long learning curve.”). 
 27. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 1344.9, INDEBTEDNESS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 2 
(2003), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf/d13449_102794/d13449p.pdf (stat-
ing under the policy servicemembers are to pay their debts in a “proper and timely manner”). 
 28. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB LAWS AND REGULATIONS, MILITARY 
LENDING ACT 1 (2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/docu-
ments/092016_cfpb_MLAExamManualUpdate.pdf [hereinafter CFPB MLA LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS] (describing the intent behind the Military Lending Act). 
 29. 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2012). 
 30. 10 U.S.C. § 987(i)(4) (2012) (defining “annual percentage rate”); see also CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB LAYS OUT GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING SERVICEMEMBERS IN THE 
PAYDAY LENDING MARKET (2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/news-
room/cfpb-lays-out-guidelines-for-protecting-servicemembers-in-the-payday-lending-mar-
ket/ [hereinafter CFPB GUIDELINES] (“Payday lenders must cap the APR – which incorporates 
all fees and costs associated with the loan – at 36 percent when lending to servicemembers.”). 
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considered an attractive target for predatory lenders as long as there is a 
way to enforce the MLA regulations.31 
Following the devastating impacts of the 2008 financial crisis, 
Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).32  Dodd-Frank enacted 
the CFPB to supervise and enforce consumer financial laws.33  Specifi-
cally, the statute says that the CFPB “shall seek to implement and, where 
applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the 
purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for con-
sumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer fi-
nancial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”34  
Within the CFPB’s authority is also the ability to penalize non-bank fi-
nancial institutions, like payday lenders, that engage in “unfair, decep-
tive, or abusive acts or practices.”35  Before Dodd-Frank, no single federal 
agency had the sole responsibility for managing consumer risk.36   
Dodd-Frank also confirms that the Bureau can administer peri-
odic exams for “(a) assessing compliance with the requirements of Fed-
eral consumer law; (b) obtaining information about the activities and 
compliance systems or procedures of such person; and (c) detecting and 
assessing risks to consumers and to markets for consumer financial prod-
ucts and services.”37  It is important to note, however, that Dodd-Frank 
did not explicitly require the CFPB to ensure financial institutions adher-
ence to MLA regulations.38  In fact, Dodd-Frank does not address the 
 
 31. See CFPB GUIDELINES, supra note 30 (listing ways in which the CFPB will curb pred-
atory lending practices used frequently with military members). 
 32. See RAJ DATE, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE NEED FOR THE CFPB (2011), https://www.consum-
erfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/lessons-learned-from-the-financial-crisis-the-need-for-
the-cfpb/ (explaining how Dodd-Frank changed the realm of consumer risk monitoring). 
 33. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012) (stating the CFPB’s purpose); see also CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCE TOOLKIT FOR LAW SCHOOL CLINICS (2014) (providing 
information that explains the supervisory role of the CFPB). 
 34. Dodd-Frank § 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a). 
 35. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531; see also Joshua L. Roquemore, Note, The 
CFPB’s Ambiguous “Abusive” Standard, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 191, 191–208 (2018) (ex-
ploring CFPB’s role in challenging abusive acts by financial institutions). 
 36. See Kelly T. Cochran, The CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 55, 55–56 (2017) (explaining how the CFPB was formed for the focused need 
of regulating consumer financial risk); see also DATE, supra note 32 (“Prior to the crisis, no 
single agency had effective tools to regulate and oversee the whole consumer finance market, 
and consumer protection was not anyone’s top priority.”). 
 37. Dodd-Frank § 1024, 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b). 
 38. Id. 
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MLA at all.39  Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank did establish the Office of Ser-
vice Member Affairs (“OSA”), which is incorporated within the CFPB.40  
As a result, it seems practical that OSA, and therefore the CFPB, take on 
the duty of examining payday lenders for MLA compliance to meet the 
goal of helping servicemembers through unique financial challenges.41  
In 2013, the MLA was amended further to grant enforcement authority to 
specified agencies in the Truth in Lending Act, one of which was the 
CFPB.42  Following this amendment, the Bureau interpreted the meaning 
of enforcement to permit periodic examinations of financial institutions 
for MLA compliance.43 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF CFPB’S 
AUTHORITY 
A.         The CFPB’s Shift from Proactive to Reactive Enforcement 
In July 2013, Richard Cordray became the first director of the 
CFPB, following his appointment to the position in January 2012.44  
Cordray’s interpretation of the CFPB’s authority was one of proactive 
supervision to safeguard consumers.45  One of the first steps he took was 
prioritizing payday lenders as a risky non-bank to supervise.46  He ex-
pressed understanding towards consumers who utilized lending services 
and cautiously acknowledged there could be appropriate times for a small 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Dodd-Frank § 1013, 12 U.S.C. § 5493(3). 
 41. See HOLLY PETRAEUS, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BEHIND THE NUMBERS: 
SERVICEMEMBERS COMPLAINTS (2014), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/be-
hind-the-numbers-servicemember-complaints/ (“[O]ur job is to keep an eye on the consumer 
financial issues causing servicemembers, veterans, and military families to come to us for 
help.”). 
 42. See CFPB MLA LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 2 (discussing statutory 
amendments to the MLA in 2013). 
 43. See Bureau Reportedly Stepping Away from MLA Oversight, NAFCU (Aug. 14, 
2018), https://www.nafcu.org/newsroom/bureau-reportedly-stepping-away-mla-oversight 
(describing how examinations of lenders were regularly performed by the Bureau). 
 44. See Cochran, supra note 36, at 2 (“Richard Cordray was confirmed by the Senate as 
the Bureau’s first director on July 16, 2013 . . . .”). 
 45. See Cochran, supra note 36 (noting the supervisory role the CFPB took on following 
the agency’s formation). 
 46. See RICHARD CORDRAY, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DIRECTOR RICHARD 
CORDRAY REMARKS AT THE PAYDAY FIELD HEARING (2014), https://www.consum-
erfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/director-richard-cordray-remarks-at-the-payday-field-
hearing/ (“In January 2012, we added payday lenders to our program of supervising financial 
institutions.  It was, in fact, one of the first things we did after I took over as the Director of 
the Consumer Bureau.”). 
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loan, such as an unanticipated trip to the hospital.47  However, the CFPB 
observed that payday loans were overwhelmingly luring consumers into 
debt traps rather than being used as a short-term emergency solution.48  
The Bureau unearthed that one payday lender, Ace Cash, had training 
manuals that even highlighted how consumers would inevitably fall into 
this debt cycle.49  Cordray advocated that this predatory behavior needed 
to be proactively managed through periodic supervisory examinations to 
keep consumers from entrapment.50 
In an additional effort to protect particularly vulnerable popula-
tions, Cordray created dedicated offices for servicemembers, the elderly, 
students, and low-income individuals.51  Most notable here is the OSA, 
which works alongside the DOD to supervise military financial prac-
tices.52  When the OSA began accepting complaints in 2013, military-
specific issues quickly outnumbered other categories of complaints re-
ceived by the CFPB.53  Within those complaints by servicemembers, debt 
collection rose to the top.54 
With the CFPB acting as one of the primary watchdogs for MLA 
compliance, the Bureau found as a whole servicemembers were in debt 
about $5 million in a one-year span paying off the fees and interest of 
their short-term loans.55  Additionally, CFPB investigations uncovered a 
 
 47. See id. (reporting on times when a consumer is “in a pinch” and may need to take out 
a short-term loan). 
 48. See id. (“We found that too often payday consumers are getting caught in a revolving 
door of debt.”). 
 49. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB TAKES ACTION AGAINST ACE CASH 
EXPRESS FOR PUSHING PAYDAY BORROWERS INTO CYCLE OF DEBT (2014), https://www.con-
sumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-ace-cash-express-for-push-
ing-payday-borrowers-into-cycle-of-debt/ (discussing the steps shown in the payday lender’s 
training manual to persuade the consumer to take on more debt) [hereinafter CFPB TAKES 
ACTION]. 
 50. See CORDRAY, supra note 46 (illustrating ways the Bureau’s supervisory work has 
worked to halt predatory lending). 
 51. See Cochran, supra note 36, at 6 (providing more detail about the four offices). 
 52. See Cochran, supra note 36, at 7 (“The Office of Servicemember Affairs also works 
closely with the Department of Defense and several other federal agencies on a broad range 
of activities concerning servicemembers, guard and reserve members, and veterans, as well 
as engaging in a number of Bureau education initiatives and assisting the Office of Consumer 
Response and Office of Enforcement in monitoring complaints.”). 
 53. See HOLLY PETRAEUS, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARE UNPAID DEBTS A 
MILITARY CAREER-KILLER? (2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/are-un-
paid-debts-a-military-career-killer/ (reporting that complaints by servicemembers and their 
families have largely outgrown other categories of complaints). 
 54. Id. (stating that within military complaints, debt collection issues were frequent). 
 55. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB REPORT FINDS LOOPHOLES IN MILITARY 
LENDING ACT RULE UP COSTS FOR SERVICEMEMBERS (2014) (“Servicemembers paid about $5 
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number of lending violations from lending to servicemembers.56  For ex-
ample, in 2013, Cash America was fined for acts such as exceeding the 
36% annualized rate cap for military individuals and engaging in robo-
signing where borrowers were not given the opportunity to adequately 
review critical legal documents.57  Perhaps one of the more intriguing 
discoveries from the CFPB’s supervisory investigation was that Cash 
America intentionally destroyed incriminating records before the arrival 
of the CFPB review team.58  After this suit, Cordray stated at a Payday 
Field Hearing that the penalty imposed on Cash America was intended to 
be a message to all lenders that they could no longer skirt compliance.59 
In October 2017, following these discoveries of intentional pred-
atory practices, the CFPB announced a payday lending rule (“Payday 
Rule”) to provide even more safeguards against consumer harm.60  Pro-
vided in this rule is the “full-payment” test.61  Under this test, lenders 
must first determine if the borrower can pay off the loan while also main-
taining life’s necessities.62  The CFPB stated that this rule came into fru-
ition following years of research on borrowing behavior and determining 
which variables needed the most oversight to reduce risk.63  The Payday 
Rule was set to take effect in August 2019.64  
 
million in fees for these products.”) [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU FINDS 
LOOPHOLES]. 
 56. Id. (reporting on lending violations). 
 57. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
TAKES ACTION AGAINST PAYDAY LENDER FOR ROBO-SIGNING (2013), https://www.consum-
erfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-takes-action-
against-payday-lender-for-robo-signing/ (“Robo-signing generally refers to a practice where 
important documents that require careful review and a signature from a knowledgeable indi-
vidual are instead signed by someone else, a machine, or by someone who does not follow 
appropriate procedures.”). 
 58. Id. (reporting that Cash America was fined $19 million for destroying records prior 
to the Bureau’s examination). 
 59. See CORDRAY, supra note 46 (stating the Bureau will continue to research the payday 
lending industry and close loopholes as needed). 
 60. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB FINALIZES RULE TO STOP PAYDAY DEBT 
TRAPS (2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finalizes-rule-
stop-payday-debt-traps/ (explaining how a stronger payday rule will put an end to debt traps). 
 61. Id. (detailing how the full-payment test works). 
 62. Id. (“Lenders are required to determine whether the borrower can afford the loan 
payments and still meet basic living expenses and major financial obligations.”). 
 63. Id. (stating what the Bureau has discovered through its proactive supervision of pay-
day lenders). 
 64. Id. (“The rule takes effect 21 months after it is published in the Federal Register . . . 
.”). 
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Cordray resigned in November 2017 to run for Governor of 
Ohio.65  Within a few hours of Cordray’s resignation, President Trump 
appointed Mick Mulvaney, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, as the acting CFPB director.66  Mulvaney quickly made it pub-
licly known that he did not agree with the CFPB’s proactive approach to 
consumer protection.67  Instead, he stated that the CFPB was overstepping 
the authority it was given in Dodd-Frank.68  In agreement with this reac-
tive approach, Mulvaney announced that the Bureau would look at revis-
ing the Payday Rule, calling it “overreaching.”69  
After releasing his statements reconsidering the Payday Rule, the 
CFPB began dropping a number of pending lawsuits against predatory 
lenders.70  One of the cases the CFPB considered needless was the suit 
against Golden Valley Lending.71  This high-profile case alleged that 
Golden Valley had been charging consumers upwards of 950% interest 
rates on short-term loans.72  The CFPB also dropped its case against 
World Acceptance Corporation.73  The allegations in that case state that 
the lender was intentionally trying to trap borrowers into a debt cycle to 
 
 65. See Renae Merle, The CFPB Now Has Two Acting Directors. And Nobody Knows 
Which One Should Lead the Federal Agency, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/11/24/the-cfpb-now-has-two-act-
ing-directors-and-nobody-knows-which-one-should-lead-the-federal-agency/?utm_term=.7f 
4878b0399c (providing Cordray’s resignation date). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Glenn Thrush, Mulvaney, Watchdog Bureau’s Leader, Advises Bankers on Ways 
to Curtail Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/04/24/us/mulvaney-consumer-financial-protection-bureau.html (reporting 
on ways Mulvaney has reigned in the Bureau’s power to eliminate proactive measures). 
 68. See Chris Arnold, Trump Administration Plans to Defang Consumer Protection 
Watchdog, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/12/584980698/trump-admin-
istration-to-defang-consumer-protection-watchdog (“In a message accompanying the plan for 
the years 2018 through 2022, Mulvaney wrote, ‘we have committed to fulfill the Bureau’s 
statutory responsibilities but go no further.’”). 
 69. See Yuka Hayashi, CFPB to Reconsider Obama-Era Payday-Lending Rule, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-to-reconsider-obama-era-payday-
lending-rule-1516137329 (reporting on why Mulvaney thinks the payday lending rule needs 
to be revised). 
 70. See Ian McKendry, Payback: Dems Give CFPB’s Mulvaney the Cordray Treatment, 
AM. BANKER, Feb. 13, 2018 (reporting on dropped lawsuits against multiple payday lenders). 
 71. Id. (naming Golden Valley Lending as one of the payday lenders involved in the 
dropped lawsuits by Mulvaney). 
 72. Id. (“Golden Valley — which is said to have made loans with interest rates as high 
as 950% a year . . . .”). 
 73. See Kate Berry, CFPB Drops Probe into Lender That Gave to Mulvaney’s Cam-
paigns, AM. BANKER, Jan. 23, 2018 (“World Acceptance Corp., based in Greenville, S.C., 
said in a press release Tuesday that it had received a letter from the consumer agency ‘indi-
cating the investigation into the company’s marketing and lending practices has been com-
pleted.’”). 
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acquire an additional profit.74  While the CFPB concluded there was no 
need to pursue an enforcement action against World Acceptance, the Bu-
reau’s action raised speculation about its motivation, especially consider-
ing the fact that World Acceptance had donated to Mulvaney’s past po-
litical campaign.75 
In August 2018, Mulvaney announced that the CFPB would sus-
pend periodic supervisory exams related to MLA violations as another 
overstep of authority from Dodd-Frank.76  Despite this change in inter-
pretation of the Bureau’s authority, Mulvaney maintained that he urged 
Congress to pass a measure in order for the CFPB to resume examina-
tions.77  This suggests that Mulvaney does want to protect servicemem-
bers against financial struggles; however, he notably criticized Cordray 
for being too aggressive with MLA regulations despite concerns from 
military advocate groups that the MLA needs to be strengthened even 
more.78  These supervisory examinations, administered under Cordray, 
returned an estimated $130 million in relief to servicemembers and their 
families.79   
IV.  THE CFPB NEEDS TO MAINTAIN A PROACTIVE APPROACH TO MLA 
COMPLIANCE 
A.         Under a Reactive Approach, the Intended Effect of MLA 
Regulations Will Be Weakened 
Without supervision and examination, it is unlikely that payday 
lenders will proactively choose to abide by the MLA regulations that they 
 
 74. See id. (stating that the probe was initiated after reports that the lender was trying to 
profit from “repeat borrowers”). 
 75. Id. (“The decision immediately drew criticism from consumer advocates, who 
charged that acting CFPB Director Mick Mulvaney, who is from South Carolina, had received 
at least $4,500 from World Acceptance’s political action committee when he was a law-
maker.”). 
 76. See Glenn Thrush, Mulvaney Looks to Weaken Oversight of Military Lending, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/us/politics/mulvaney-military-
lending.html (reporting that Mulvaney contends that the Bureau can only go as far as the law 
allows). 
 77. Id. (“Mr. Mulvaney is urging Congress to quickly pass a measure that would give 
him the power to resume supervisory examinations . . . .”). 
 78. Id. (“The proposal surprised advocates for military families, who have urged the gov-
ernment to use its powers to crack down harder on unscrupulous lenders.”). 
 79. Id. (“[T]he consumer agency has returned more than $130 million to service mem-
bers, veterans and their families . . . .”). 
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had been actively fighting during Cordray’s time at the CFPB.80  The 
payday lending industry is a large and lucrative business, with estimated 
loans of $46 billion per year and $7 billion in fees per year.81  Unsurpris-
ingly, the payday lending industry has spent millions on lobbying groups 
and political campaigns that help their bottom line.82  For instance, pay-
day lenders often criticized the CFPB under Cordray, saying that the 
heightened restrictions would eventually create “credit deserts” for con-
sumers.83  An advocate for payday lending further stated that over forty 
million Americans utilize short-term payday loans as their only source of 
credit.84  This statement, however, just highlights the importance of en-
suring that lenders are not abusing a vast number of consumers with their 
deceptive lending practices.85 
As previously discussed with the CFPB dropping a lawsuit 
against World Acceptance Corporation,  it is important to also recognize 
that this payday lender donated over $60,000 to Mulvaney’s past con-
gressional campaigns.86  While the amount may seem low in the grand 
scheme of political funds, it is worth noting that Mulvaney stated that he 
gives priority in scheduling meetings to those who have contributed to 
his endeavors.87  Some are concerned that because Mulvaney took these 
 
 80. See Renae Merle, ‘I Have Not Burned the Place Down’:  Trump Appointee Defends 
His Leadership of Consumer Watchdog, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/04/11/mick-mulvaney-to-defend-leadership-of-con-
sumer-watchdog-before-house-committee/?utm_term=.079df0499f73 (providing statements 
from opponents who stress that the payday industry will not “snap into full compliance”). 
 81. See Stacy Cowley, Payday Lending Faces Tough New Restrictions by Consumer 
Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/business/payday-
loans-cfpb.html (“The operators of those stores make around $46 billion a year in loans, col-
lecting $7 billion in fees.”). 
 82. See Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, Payday Lenders Throw Millions at Powerful Pol-
iticians to Get Their Way, CNN MONEY (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://money.cnn.com/2014/12/18/pf/payday-lenders-contributions/index.html (discussing 
the ties between payday lenders and political campaigns). 
 83. See Cowley, supra note 81 (“The new restrictions ‘will create credit deserts for many 
Americans who do not have access to traditional banking,’ said Edward D’Alessio, the exec-
utive director of Financial Service Centers of America, an industry trade group.”). 
 84. See Sabri Ben-Achour & Jana Kasperkevic, Payday Loan Business Facing Tougher 
Rules, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/10/05/your-
money/payday-loans-regulation (“‘Forty million Americans rely on small dollar loans to 
make ends meet,’ said Trent Duffy, a spokesman for the Community Financial Services As-
sociation.”). 
 85. See generally CORDRAY, supra note 46 (discussing the effects of predatory lending 
on consumers). 
 86. See Thrush, supra note 67 (stating that Mulvaney received $63,000 from payday 
lenders). 
 87. See Thrush, supra note 67 (“If you’re a lobbyist who never gave us money, I didn’t 
talk to you. If you’re a lobbyist who gave us money, I might talk to you.”). 
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campaign contributions from payday lenders when he was running for 
Congress, he may be more inclined to continue to ease payday lending 
restrictions.88 
Especially troubling is what effect these past donations will have 
on servicemembers who have been regularly exploited by these lenders.89  
By rolling back the MLA supervision, it is almost certain that a large 
number of payday lenders will exploit loopholes or fail to comply with 
the MLA, as they have demonstrated in the past.90  Military advocacy 
groups have illustrated how if there is any “wiggle-room,” lenders will 
find it.91  For example, the first iteration of the MLA did not include loans 
that had terms longer than 91 days.92  Lenders easily adjusted their lend-
ing contracts to the lengthen the loan period for higher profit yield.93  In 
another instance, Ohio lenders restructured under the guise of “mortgage 
lenders” to circumvent compliance with regulations.94  These actions un-
dermine the intention Congress had in passing the MLA to safeguard the 
military.95 
B.         The Reactive Approach Increases Financial Harm to the 
Military 
When Mulvaney announced that the CFPB would no longer con-
duct supervisory exams for MLA compliance, forty-nine Senators 
 
 88. See Thrush, supra note 67 (reporting on concerns about Mulvaney’s intention with 
the CFPB when he was the acting CFPB director). 
 89. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU FINDS LOOPHOLES, supra note 55 (discussing how 
lenders have exploited MLA loopholes to take advantage of military members). 
 90. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU FINDS LOOPHOLES, supra note 55 (providing ex-
amples on how creditors have gotten around previous payday rules). 
 91. See Jeff Guo, Many States Have Cracked Down on Payday Loans. Here’s How Lend-
ers Still Get Away with It, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/09/many-states-have-cracked-down-on-payday-
loans-heres-how-lenders-still-get-away-with-it/?utm_term=.267d6f566925 (“‘If there’s any 
wiggle room, if there’s a license that allows you to continue doing what you were doing, then 
lenders will gravitate to that,’ explained Tom Feltner of the Consumer Federation of America, 
a watchdog group.”). 
 92. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU FINDS LOOPHOLES, supra note 55 (illustrating that 
the current rules do not cover loans greater than 91 days). 
 93. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU FINDS LOOPHOLES, supra note 55 (explaining how 
easily lenders can circumvent the previous MLA restrictions). 
 94. See Guo, supra note 91 (providing an example where lenders find holes in the MLA 
for increased profit). 
 95. See CFPB GUIDELINES, supra note 30 (asserting that Congress passed the MLA to 
protect the financial well-being of servicemembers); see also FDIC COMPLIANCE 
EXAMINATION MANUAL, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/compli-
anceexaminationmanual.pdf.  
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directed a letter to the CFPB analogizing the reactive approach to the 
Armed Forces no longer using radar technology.96  In agreement, retired 
Army Colonel and former assistant director for OSA, Paul Kantwill, 
warned that reactive enforcement comes around when “the harm has al-
ready occurred.”97  That is, once the CFPB reacts to a consumer’s com-
plaint, the borrower is likely already trapped in a debt cycle that is nega-
tively impacting their life in a number of ways.98 
Not only is financial fitness drilled into military culture, the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice explicitly details how incurring large 
amounts of debt is considered a military offense.99  Failure to pay down 
debts can negatively impact a servicemember’s credit score, which can 
result in the loss of a security clearance.100  Overwhelming debt is one of 
the most common reasons why a servicemember’s clearance is re-
voked.101  When this happens, the individual then has to be shuffled 
around into other jobs.102  Consequently, the economic issues of service-
members directly affects the readiness of the military.103  If a service-
member’s financial problem becomes too significant, the individual can 
be ultimately discharged from the military.104  As stipulated in the 2006 
 
 96. See Evan Weinberger, Senate Dems Blast CFPB Changes to Military Lending Super-
vision, 30 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 33 (Aug. 23, 2018) (reporting on the letter sent to Mul-
vaney). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 14 (“Military borrowers are required to main-
tain bank accounts in order to receive direct deposit of military pay and are subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice that penalizes deliberately writing a check not covered by 
funds on deposit.”). 
 100. See PETRAEUS, supra note 53 (explaining that negative information on a credit report 
can result in a servicemember’s security clearance being pulled). 
 101. See Gideon Weissman & Ed Mierzwinski, Protecting Those Who Serve: How the 
CFPB Safeguards Military Members and Veterans from Abuse in the Financial Marketplace, 
U.S. PUB. INT. RESEARCH GROUP, at 9 (June 2017), https://uspirg.org/reports/usp/protecting-
those-who-serve (“Negative information on credit reports can result in reduced military clear-
ance levels, important for a military career.”). 
 102. Id. (“Former Navy Master Chief Petty Officer Terry Scott has said, ‘the number one 
reason our sailors are forced from one job to another is because they lose their security clear-
ance . . . and the number one reason they lose their security clearance is because of financial 
difficulties.’”). 
 103. See id. (discussing how the Pentagon has consistently stated the need for financial 
well-being to maintain military readiness). 
 104. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 64 (“[M]ilitary personnel that do not meet 
their financial commitments may be subjected to confinement, clearance, court martial, trans-
fer, or even discharge.”). 
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DOD report, this immense pressure is precisely what predatory lenders 
prey on.105 
More recently in 2012, a study found that servicemembers were 
significantly more likely to use non-bank borrowing in a five-year span 
compared to their civilian counterparts.106  As previously discussed, there 
are variables like young age, financial inexperience, and frequent location 
changes that set-up the military to be a susceptible population for preda-
tory lending.107  The Wounded Warrior Project also observed that a par-
ticular subset of veterans who suffer from mental illness following their 
time in the service are especially vulnerable to payday lending.108  These 
are all factors that are largely out of a servicemember’s control.109  Be-
yond that, however, there are deceptive abusive lending practices to ex-
ploit those characteristics that will likely flourish given the CFPB propo-
sition of minimal regulatory supervision.110 
In a way, payday lenders play “good cop, bad cop” when target-
ing servicemembers.  When acting as a good cop, they project an image 
that they are a “friend” of the military despite no evidence to suggest this 
is accurate.111  For example, the CFPB discovered a payday lender using 
official logos of the Department of Veterans Affairs on its advertise-
ments.112  In other promotions, a payday lender also included photographs 
 
 105. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 64 (reporting on military characteristics lend-
ers exploit). 
 106. See Weissman & Mierzwinski, supra note 101, at 8 (reporting 35% vs. 30%). 
 107. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3. 
 108. See Weissman & Mierzwinski, supra note 101, at 10 (“According to the Wounded 
Warrior Project, scammers target veterans for a few reasons:  guaranteed government income, 
veterans’ willingness to trust companies representing themselves as friends of the military, 
and, in some cases, physical and mental problems that veterans may have developed during 
their service.”). 
 109. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 64 (reporting on military characteristics that 
servicemembers do not have control over). 
 110. See TRIPOLI & MIX, supra note 12 (illustrating the prolific number of payday lenders 
and the measures that take to target the military). 
 111. See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, Service Members Left Vulner-
able to Payday Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://dealbook.ny-
times.com/2013/11/21/service-members-left-vulnerable-to-payday-loans/ (reporting on ways 
payday lenders try to tailor their business to appear like they are associated with the military). 
 112. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB TAKES ACTION AGAINST MORTGAGE 
LENDER FOR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING (2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-mortgage-lender-for-deceptive-advertising/ (“The 
company’s typical advertisement for VA mortgages featured the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs seal and logo at the top of the page and described its loan products as part of a ‘distinctive 
program offered by the U.S. government.’”). 
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of men and women dressed in military uniform.113  Similarly, another 
payday lender stated in a publication, “[m]ost of our loan specialists are 
former military personnel who have been in your shoes.”114  Another way 
lenders have promoted this military affiliation is through the naming of 
their storefronts.115  Stores such as “Force One Lending Inc.,” “Pioneer 
Military Lending,” and “Veterans First Financial Services” are ubiqui-
tous around military bases.116  These examples illustrate some of the ways 
that payday lenders create an image as the good guys who are simply 
lending a hand to servicemembers.117 
Once lenders have trapped individuals into a debt cycle, they 
switch over to a bad cop role and aggressively remind servicemembers of 
their financial responsibilities.118  The CFPB discovered that payday 
lenders would threaten to report unpaid debts to the borrower’s military 
superiors.119  Even though lenders are barred from calling commanding 
officers by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, there are numerous 
reported complaints of them threatening this exact tactic.120  This fear of 
reprimand is often enough to pressure a servicemember into taking on 
another loan to pay down a previous debt.121  Another instance found a 
payday lender, Ace Cash Express, using legal jargon to intimidate mili-
tary borrowers into rolling over loans.122  Without supervision by the 
CFPB, payday lenders may abuse their lending practices under the 
 
 113. See Silver-Greenberg & Eavis, supra note 111 (explaining how predatory lenders use 
advertising to target servicemembers). 
 114. See Silver-Greenberg & Eavis, supra note 111 (“‘We know the military because we 
are former military,’ Omni says on its website. ‘Most of our loan specialists are former mili-
tary personnel who have been in your shoes.’”). 
 115. See TRIPOLI & MIX, supra note 12, at 17 (listing payday lenders with military sound-
ing names). 
 116. See Henriques, supra note 1 (providing the example where Camp Pendleton’s zip 
code has more payday lenders than any other zip code in CA). 
 117. See TRIPOLI & MIX, supra note 12, at 17–19 (providing more discussion of perceived 
military affiliations).  
 118. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining how lenders have used military 
financial culture to threaten servicemembers). 
 119. See PETRAEUS, supra note 53 (“[W]e received reports that some debt collectors are 
threatening servicemembers by claiming that they will report unpaid debt to their command-
ing officer.”). 
 120. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012); see also PETRAEUS, supra note 53 (reminding that debt 
collectors don’t have the authority to contact your security clearance manager about debts). 
 121. See Silver-Greenberg & Eavis, supra note 111 (“The service members said they were 
told that if they fell behind, the lenders would go to their commanding officers.”). 
 122. See CFPB TAKES ACTION, supra note 49 (“Collectors would use legal jargon in calls 
to consumers, such as telling a consumer he could be subject to ‘immediate proceedings based 
on the law’ even though ACE did not actually sue consumers or attempt to bring criminal 
charges against them for non-payment of debts.”). 
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assumption that the servicemember is not likely to file a complaint with 
the CFPB given their predicament.123 
V.  RECOMMENDATION & CONCLUSION 
Although there is a debate about whether the CFPB has authority 
to perform supervisory examinations for MLA compliance, the Bureau 
should revert back to the proactive approach based on its working rela-
tionship with the DOD and the positive strides that the Bureau has made 
in protecting servicemembers from predatory payday lenders.124  How-
ever, in December 2018, the Senate confirmed Kathleen Kraninger as the 
new director of the CFPB, and she is likely to continue with the current 
reactive approach to regulation.125  When interviewed about the CFPB’s 
weakened surveillance at her initial confirmation hearing, Kraninger 
maintained that she did not disagree with any of Mulvaney’s policies to 
date.126  In the event that the reactive approach is here to stay for some 
time, it is then up to the states to protect their citizens from predatory 
practices.127 
In an effort to mitigate consumer financial risk, states have al-
ready looked to strengthen their state lending policies.128  For instance, in 
late 2018, South Dakota’s ballot on lending regulation was approved to 
enforce an interest rate cap where the state previously had no re-
strictions.129  Additionally, in Colorado, an initiative on the ballot for No-
vember 2018 aimed to thwart interest rates that exceeded 36%, conven-
iently falling in line with the MLA regulation.130  However, there is 
 
 123. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 10.   
 124. See Kate Berry, Pentagon, Others Baffled by CFPB Plan to Cease Military Lending 
Exams, AM. BANKER, Oct. 11, 2018 (“To roll back a series of well-thought-out protections 
allows for the potential of great harm to military members that cannot be remedied by en-
forcement and regulations later on.”). 
 125. See Emily Sullivan, Senate Confirms Kathy Kraninger as CFPB Director, NPR (Dec. 
6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/06/673222706/senate-confirms-kathy-kraninger-as-
cfpb-director (reporting on Kraninger’s confirmation). 
 126. See Ailsa Chang, Senate Banking Committee Approves CFPB Nominee Kathleen 
Kraninger, NPR (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/23/641359610/senate-bank-
ing-committee-approves-cfpb-nominee-kathleen-kraninger (discussing how Kraninger sup-
ports “curbing CFPB’s powers”). 
 127. See Lalita Clozel, States Preparing to Pick up Slack if CFPB Backs Down, AM. 
BANKER, Aug. 31, 2017 (explaining how states are bolstering their oversight of financial in-
stitutions). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. (discussing South Dakota’s ballot approval). 
 130. See Brian Eason, Payday Loans Have Average Interest Rates of 129% in Colorado. 
A Ballot Measure Proposes Capping Them, THE DENVER POST (Feb. 21, 2018), 
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concern about what returns will come from these strengthened policies.131  
For example, one state restricted how many loans an individual could 
borrow within a specific time period.132  Facially, this seemed like a so-
lution to address lenders who intentionally profit from borrowers rolling 
over loans in a short period of time.133  Unfortunately, as soon as the re-
stricted time period elapsed, the borrowers then took out a loan to cover 
previous debts, only this time the loans were larger with higher interest 
rates.134  As previously discussed, this kind of behavior has already been 
recognized where payday lenders have intentionally looked for ways to 
circumvent MLA regulations to target  servicemembers.135  While these 
state level policies may help to restrict abusive practices of predatory 
lenders, the past has shown there still needs to be proactive monitoring to 
determine when loopholes are being exploited.136 
Even before Cordray’s departure from the Bureau, states were 
recognizing the need to take on supervisory authority given the Trump 
administration’s criticism of the agency’s approach.137  Aligned with their 
concerns, a number of states took it upon themselves to create “mini-
CFPBs.”138  In these states, their attorneys general allocate time and 
 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/21/payday-lenders-colorado-interest-rate-limits/ (“A 
ballot initiative filed this month with the Colorado secretary of state’s office would cap the 
annual interest rates for payday loans at 36% — a dramatic reduction from the 129 % such 
lenders charge on average now.”); see also LAUREN SAUNDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
WHY 36%? THE HISTORY, USE, AND PURPOSE OF THE 36% INTEREST RATE CAP (2013), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/why36pct.pdf (“A 36% rate gives lenders an in-
centive to offer longer term loans with a more affordable structure and to avoid making loans 
that borrowers cannot afford to repay.”). 
 131. See CORDRAY, supra note 46 (providing examples of state policies and subsequent 
reactions by lenders). 
 132. CORDRAY, supra note 46.  
 133. See CORDRAY, supra note 46 (illustrating how the pitfalls some state policies experi-
ence when the lender recognizes a way to go around the law). 
 134. See CORDRAY, supra note 46 (“[T]his tells us that even if state law precludes con-
sumers from taking out another payday loan immediately, the pressure of their circumstances 
– now intensified by the heavy expense of the payday loan itself – tends to force consumers 
to find their way back to the payday lender about as soon as the law permits.”). 
 135. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU FINDS LOOPHOLES, supra note 55 (discussing how 
lenders have exploited MLA loopholes to take advantage of military members). 
 136. CORDRAY, supra note 46.  
 137. See Chris Bruce, States Flexing Enforcement Muscle on Prospect of CFPB Pullback, 
109 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 9 (Sept. 6, 2017) (explaining why states decided there was a 
need to provide more resources to monitor consumer financial risk); see also Kate Berry, Can 
State AGs Really Serves as ‘Mini CFPBs’?, AM. BANKER, Aug. 20, 2018 (“Some states, mean-
while, already ramped up their financial consumer protection efforts before President Trump 
came to office.”). 
 138. See Berry, supra note 137 (reporting on whether states have the ability to fill in the 
Bureau’s gaps on consumer issues); see also Clozel, supra note 127 (“The consumer 
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resources to make monitoring of financial laws a priority.139  For exam-
ple, in Pennsylvania, the attorney general specifically recruited a con-
sumer protection attorney to head the state’s Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Unit.140  Maryland has also created a dedicated unit for these 
consumer issues and is expected to budget $1.2 million for this office.141  
An established mini-CFPB is a place where states could readily incorpo-
rate and codify the importance of MLA regulation for their citizens.142  
This would be especially important for states that have a large military 
population.143  For instance, in Virginia’s mini-CFPB, the attorney gen-
eral has illustrated in news releases the priority of ensuring that service-
members are safeguarded from predatory lending even if the supervision 
has been weakened within the CFPB.144  Hopefully the work of these of-
fices will draw attention to the need for consumer risk monitoring at the 
federal level.145  After all, there are some actions that the state simply 
cannot take on due to a limited budget and resources.146 
If the CFPB continues with the reactive approach, military per-
sonnel serving our country will suffer harm before there are any 
 
protection fight has become particularly resonant under the Trump administration, as many 
advocates fear that once CFPB Director Richard Cordray leaves the new leader will dial back 
the CFPB’s activities.”). 
 139. See Berry, supra note 137 (“The AGs sent Mulvaney a letter in December warning 
the Trump administration appointee that they stood ready to ramp up efforts if the CFPB let 
down its guard.”). 
 140. See Bruce, supra note 137 (“Attorney General Josh Shapiro in July unveiled a new 
Consumer Financial Protection Unit to give Pennsylvania consumers more protection and 
tapped Nicholas Smyth, a CFPB veteran, to head the new office.”); see also Clozel, supra 
note 127 (stating that the Pennsylvania unit will make a priority to focus on the four dedicated 
offices established in the Bureau – seniors, students, low income, and servicemembers).  
 141. See Berry, supra note 137 (“Maryland has created a new Financial Consumer Protec-
tion Commission chaired by Gary Gensler, a former Goldman Sachs executive and head of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the Obama administration. The state legisla-
ture is expected to set aside $1.2 million to create 10 positions for the unit.”). 
 142. Berry, supra note 137. 
 143. See generally TRIPOLI & MIX, supra note 12 (illustrating the importance of protecting 
military members from predatory lenders). 
 144. See Berry, supra note 137 (“In 2015, Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring created 
a special unit targeting predatory lenders.  Virginia has doubled the number of attorneys fo-
cused specifically on consumer protection to ten from five and added eighteen additional per-
sonnel including dispute resolution specialists and paralegals.”). 
 145. See Berry, supra note 137 (illustrating how the states can provide a lot of help in this 
area but there still needs to be a strong federal supervision of this kind of financial risk). 
 146. See Berry, supra note 137 (“But the states also are less likely to take action against 
companies for violations of fair-lending laws or disparate impact, which are resource-inten-
sive, require expensive statistical analysis and could lead to more litigation.”). 
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enforcement measures brought against lenders.147  Based on considerable 
research by the DOD and additional studies by other groups, there is no 
doubt that servicemembers will be one of the most significantly affected 
populations due to this lack of supervision.148  While it does not appear 
that the Bureau will be returning to the proactive approach in the near 
future, states are wise not to wait around for a different administration to 
potentially change course.149  Now is the time for states to be strengthen-
ing their lending policies and restricting predatory lenders.150  Further-
more, even if the CFPB does return to the proactive approach, establish-
ing mini-CFPBs at the state level may be what is necessary to provide the 
ultimate protection.151  Those payday lenders who set up shop in droves 
around military bases152 may be more cautious about their daily transac-
tions if they know there is a ground-level supervisory team surveilling 
them for potential violations.153 
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 147. See Weinberger, supra note 96 (discussing how a reactive response comes too late in 
regard to the individual’s financial harm). 
 148. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 5 (providing information on why the military 
targeted by payday lenders); see also TRIPOLI & MIX, supra note 12 (more explanation on 
military financial harm). 
 149. See Berry, supra note 137 (discussing the changes states have made in reaction to the 
CFPB’s new approach for lenders). 
 150. See generally Berry, supra note 137 (illustrating how states are proactively bolstering 
their predatory lending regulations). 
 151. See Berry, supra note 137 (discussing the strengths of mini-CFPBs). 
 152. Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military:  
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 153. See generally id. (discussing how lender violations flourish when there is a lack of 
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